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Summary 
 
Company directors, being human, may be tempted to promote their own 
interests rather than those of the companies on whose boards they serve.  
Directors are subject to a number of legal duties.   
 
A director has a fiduciary duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the 
company.  A number of other duties flow from this duty such as the duty to 
avoid a conflict of interests.  The duty of a director not to appropriate a 
corporate opportunity belonging to the company of which he or she is a director, 
also flows from the duty to avoid a conflict of interests. 
 
The common-law duties of directors which have their origins in English law, 
have developed over a number of years.  Because of the difficulty that directors 
had in establishing what their duties were, a number of jurisdictions embarked 
on a process of codifying or partially codifying these duties.  South Africa, 
Australia and England are three countries that have promulgated legislation 
which has resulted in the codification or partial codification of directors’ duties. 
The purpose of the codification or partial codification of directors’ duties was 
firstly to clarify the duties of directors, and secondly to make the duties more 
accessible to those affected by them – the directors of companies. 
 
In South Africa the Companies Act 71 of 2008 has partially codified the duties of 
directors. Because directors’ duties have only been partially codified there is 
uncertainty regarding their scope. This dissertation will focus on the possible 
effect of the 2008 Companies Act on the duty of a director not to take a 
corporate opportunity falling to the company. 
 
In this dissertation I address two issues involving the effect of the 2008 
Companies Act on the duty of a director not to appropriate a corporate 
iv 
 
opportunity belonging to the company.  Firstly, I consider whether the partially 
codified directors’ duties are wide enough to cover issues involving the 
appropriation of corporate opportunities.  Secondly, I consider the appropriate 
common-law test or tests to be applied in determining whether, in the specific 
circumstances, an opportunity should be classified as a corporate opportunity.  
 
In considering whether the partially codified duties of directors are wide enough 
to include the corporate-opportunity rule, I compare the approach to corporate 
opportunities and the corporate-opportunity rule in South Africa, Australia and 
England. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
 
1.1  Introduction 
A company is a juristic person.  When a company acts it does so through its 
board of directors.  Section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘2008 
Companies Act’) provides that the business and affairs of a company must be 
managed by or under the direction of its board.  The board of directors of a 
company has full authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any 
function of the company to the extent that the 2008 Companies Act or a 
company’s memorandum of incorporation does not provide otherwise.1 
 
From the time of his or her appointment a director is subject to four important 
fiduciary duties.2  A director may not exceed his or her powers, exercise his or 
her powers for an improper purpose, fetter his or her discretion, or place him- or 
herself in a position where his or her personal interests conflict with his or her 
duties to the company.3  The well-established duty of a director to exercise his 
or her powers in good faith and in the best interest of the company has been 
entrenched by the partial codification of directors’ duties in the 2008 Companies 
Act.4   
 
The duty to act in the best interests of the company gives rise to a number of 
further duties or rules.5  These include the duty of a director not to make a 
secret profit (the so-called ‘no-profit rule’) and the duty not to take up an 
                                            
1
 Section 66(1) of the 2008 Companies Act. 
2
 Havenga 1996 SA Merc LJ 233. 
3
 Blackman Companies 178.  
4
 Section 76 of the 2008 Companies Act; Visser Sitrus (Pty) Ltd v Goedehoop Situs (Pty) Ltd 
2014 5 SA 179 (WCC) 198 (‘Visser Sitrus’); Da Silva v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd 2008 6 SA 620 
(SCA) 627 (‘Da Silva’); Delport et al Henochsberg 292; Cassim et al Company Law 523.  
5
 Blackman Companies 178. 
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economic opportunity that belongs to the company (the ‘corporate-opportunity 
rule’).6  The focus of this dissertation is on corporate opportunities and the 
corporate-opportunity rule. 
 
1.2  Background 
 
In its original form, the corporate-opportunity rule has its origins in the United 
States of America (‘US’) and has, to a greater or lesser extent, been adopted or 
recognised as a separate rule in a number of Commonwealth countries.7  The 
rule provides that a director may not divert to him- or herself an opportunity that 
belongs to the company, or in which the company has an interest, or which the 
company may have wanted to exploit for itself.8 
 
If a director breaches his or her fiduciary duties by appropriating an opportunity 
that belongs to the company, the company has two possible remedies available 
to it.  It can either claim any profit made by the director, or it can claim the 
opportunity acquired or retained by the director in breach of his or her duty.9     
 
For a company to claim a profit made from an opportunity or the opportunity 
itself, it must show that the opportunity in question qualifies as a corporate 
opportunity.  This dissertation will accordingly consider the corporate-
opportunity rule in particular.   
 
The appropriation of a corporate opportunity may result in a breach a director’s 
duty to act in the best interests of the company and the no-conflict/no-profit 
rules.  However, there may be situations where the no-conflict and no-profit 
                                            
6
 Da Silva para [18]; Blackman Companies 178.  
7
 For example, Canada, New Zealand, Australia and England.  See Havenga 2013 TSAR 259. 
8
 Magnus Diamond Mining Syndicate v Macdonald & Hawthorne 1909 ORC 65 (‘Magnus 
Diamond’); Spieth v Nagel [1998] JOL 1320 (W) 1332 (‘Spieth’); Havenga Directors 163; 
Cassim et al Company Law 538; Blackman Companies 225.   
9
 Symington v Pretoria-Oos Privaat Hospitaal Bedryfs 2005 (5) SA 550 (SCA) 563C-D 
(‘Symington’); Da Silva para [18]. 
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rules do not apply.  In these cases the corporate-opportunity rule is applied to 
establish when an opportunity is a corporate opportunity that may not be 
appropriated.   
 
Before the 2008 Companies Act the duties of directors were derived mainly 
from the common law, and in particular English common law.10  The 2008 
Companies Act has resulted in the partial codification of directors’ duties.11  This 
dissertation will consider two important issues in relation to the appropriation of 
corporate opportunities by directors.  The first is whether the partially codified 
duties of directors are wide enough to provide for matters involving the 
appropriation of corporate opportunities.  Secondly, the appropriate test or tests 
that ought to be applied when determining whether, in the particular 
circumstances, an opportunity is a corporate opportunity will be considered.   
 
To understand the effect that the partial codification of directors’ duties may 
have on the application of the corporate opportunity rule better, this dissertation 
includes an analysis of the common-law approach to matters involving the 
appropriation of corporate opportunities, and more specifically, the corporate- 
opportunity rule.  Only then can a conclusion be reached on how corporate 
opportunity issues could possibly be dealt with under the 2008 Companies Act. 
 
The paucity of South African decisions on matters involving the appropriation of 
corporate opportunities and the corporate-opportunity rule requires a 
consideration of the approach to corporate opportunities taken in other 
jurisdictions. I shall accordingly consider and compare the approach to that 
which Australian and English law have adopted to matters involving the 
appropriation of corporate opportunities. 
 
                                            
10
 Cassim et al Company Law 509. 
11
 Visser Sitrus 198; Delport et al Henochsberg 285; Cassim et al Company Law 507; Botha 
2009 Obiter 713; Havenga 2013 TSAR 263. 
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The choice of Australia and England is motivated by three factors. 
 
 Both countries have recently adopted legislation that either partially codifies 
(Australian Corporations Act 2001) or codifies (UK Companies Act 2001) 
directors’ duties. 
 The common-law principles and rules in South African company law 
generally, and the law that has developed in regard to the duties’ of directors, 
share a common heritage with Australian and English company law. 
 
 Both Australian and English courts have considered matters involving the 
appropriation of corporate opportunities post-codification. 
 
In addition to these reasons for undertaking a comparative study, the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, enjoins courts, generally, to 
consider foreign law when interpreting legislation or developing the common 
law.12  More specifically, the 2008 Companies Act enjoins the courts to consider 
foreign company law when interpreting or applying the Act.13  
 
Post-codification decisions in Australia and the UK may provide a useful guide 
as to the application of statutory principles to matters involving the appropriation 
of corporate opportunities. In addition these decisions may also provide an 
indication of how common-law rules, such as the corporate-opportunity rule, 
have been used to apply statutory principles. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
12
 Section 39 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
13
 Section 5(2) of the 2008 Companies Act provides that “[t]o the extent appropriate, a court 
interpreting or applying this Act may consider foreign company law.” 
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1.3 Chapter overview  
 
Chapter Two considers the common-law approach to matters involving the 
appropriation of corporate opportunities.  This discussion entails a consideration 
of the corporate-opportunity rule and the various tests that have developed to 
determine when an opportunity can be regarded as a corporate opportunity.  
This chapter further analyses the duties of directors as set out in the 2008 
Companies Act to determine whether the partially codified duties are wide 
enough to include matters involving the appropriation of corporate opportunities.  
The chapter concludes that corporate opportunities are covered by the 2008 Act 
and that the common-law corporate-opportunity rule will continue to apply in 
determining whether an opportunity ought to be classified as a corporate 
opportunity.    
 
In Chapter Three I evaluate the Australian approach to corporate opportunities.  
The provisions of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 (‘Australian 
Corporations Act’) and the approach of Australian courts to matters involving 
the appropriation of corporate opportunities, are evaluated and compared to the 
position in South Africa 
 
In Chapter Four I consider the English approach to matters involving the 
appropriation of corporate opportunities.  Attention is paid to the provisions of 
the UK Companies Act 2006 (‘UK Companies Act’) dealing with corporate 
opportunities and to the approach of UK courts to corporate opportunity issues 
and the similarities and differences, if any, between the South African and UK 
approaches are considered and evaluated. 
   
In the concluding chapter I argue that the partially codified directors’ duties in 
the 2008 Companies Act are wide enough to cover matters involving the 
appropriation of corporate opportunities.  Secondly, I argue that the common- 
law corporate-opportunity rule will continue to apply to corporate opportunity 
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matters determined under the 2008 Act.  Having considered the approach of the 
Australian and English courts, I conclude by offering a possible approach that 
South African courts may take in matters involving the appropriation of 
corporate opportunities.  
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Chapter 2  
 
The Corporate-Opportunity Rule in South Africa 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The 2008 Companies Act, which became law on 1 May 2011, has partially 
codified the duties of directors.14  The question arising is how the partial 
codification of directors’ duties will affect the application of the corporate-
opportunity rule.  
 
The chapter first considers the common-law approach to corporate 
opportunities.  This includes a discussion of the no-profit and no-conflict rules 
and the corporate-opportunity rule, and the tests developed to determine when 
an opportunity can be classified as a corporate opportunity.  Secondly, the 2008 
Companies Act is considered to determine whether the partially codified 
directors’ duties are wide enough to cover corporate opportunities.  
 
South African courts traditionally dealt with corporate opportunity matters in 
terms of either the no-conflict rule or the no-profit rule.15   These rules do not 
address when an opportunity ought to be classified as a corporate opportunity.16  
In Da Silva the Supreme Court of Appeal recognised the corporate-opportunity 
rule for the first time.17  
 
 
                                            
14
 Visser Sitrus 198; Delport et al Henochsberg 285; Cassim et al Company Law 507; Botha 
2009 Obiter 713; Havenga 2013 TSAR 263. 
15
 Brews 1986 SA Com LJ 14; Havenga 1996 SA Merc LJ 52.   
16
 Cartoon 1980 THRHR 68 - 9; Brews 1986 SA Com LJ 14; Davies Modern Company Law 560.  
In the United States a rule, distinct from the no-conflict and no-profit rules and termed the 
corporate-opportunity rule has been developed by the courts. 
17
 Da Silva 627.     
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2.2 Corporate opportunities 
 
A director stands, from the time of his or her appointment, in a fiduciary 
relationship to the company.18  Directors must use their positions for the benefit 
of the company and must act honestly and with candour.  Directors are placed 
under four fundamental fiduciary duties.19   These are that they must: 
 
 not exceed their powers;20 or 
 exercise their powers for an improper or ulterior purpose;21 or 
 fetter their discretion;22 or  
 not place themselves in a position where their personal interests 
conflict with their duties to the company.23. 
 
A number of further rules or duties flow from the duty of a director to avoid a 
conflict of interests.24  This includes the duty not to make a secret profit (no-
profit rule) and the duty not to take an opportunity belonging to the company 
(the corporate-opportunity rule).25 
                                            
18
 Sibex Construction (SA) Pty Ltd v Injecatseal CC [1988] 4 All SA 190 (T) 200 - 202 (‘Sibex 
Construction’); Blackman Companies 178; Cassim 2008 SALJ 731.  
19
 For a discussion of the four fundamental duties see Blackman Companies 178ff; Magnus 
Diamond 76; Sibex Construction 200 - 202; Joseph Forman Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Forim Holdings 
[1999] 3 All SA 204 (W) 215 (‘Forim Holdings’). 
20
 Sparks & Young Ltd v John Hoastson (1906) 27 NLR 634, 641; Cohen v Segal 1970 3 All SA 
308 (W). 
21
 Treasure Trove Diamonds Ltd v Hyman 1928 AD 464 (‘Treasure Trove Diamonds’) 479; Mills 
v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150 (HCA) 185; Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425 ((HCA) 438; 
Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum Ltd 1974 1 All ER 1126 (PC) 1133.  
22
 Coronation Syndicate Ltd v Lilenfeld & the New Fortuna Co Ltd 1903 TS 489; Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen 1980 4 All SA 535 (W). 
23
 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 (‘Robinson’) 178 – 9. 
24
 Movie Camera Company (Pty) Ltd v van Wyk [2003] 2 All SA 291 (C) (‘Movie Camera 
Company’) para [43]; Cassim et al Company Law 534; Lowry 1998 MLR 517. 
25
 The other duties that flow from the duty of a director to avoid a conflict of interests are the 
duty of director not to act in a matter for the company where he has an interest in the matter; the 
duty to deal with the company openly and in good faith; the duty not to compete with the 
company; and the duty not to misuse company information (For a general discussion of these 
common-law duties see Blackman Companies 178ff.); Cassim et al Company Law 535 regards 
the no-conflict rule as a sub-rule of the duty to avoid a conflict of interests. 
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Situations involving the appropriation of corporate opportunities have 
traditionally been dealt with on the basis of either the no-conflict or the no-profit 
rule.26  These two rules are now considered individually. 
 
2.2.1 Duty to avoid a conflict of interests: The no-conflict rule 
 
As a fiduciary, a director may not place him- or herself in a position where his or 
her interests conflict with the interests of the company on whose board he or 
she serves.27  The no- conflict rule provides that a director may not act for his or 
her company if he or she has an interest in a matter which conflicts, or may 
possibly conflict, with his or her duty to the company.28    
 
The no-conflict rule is strictly enforced.  This strict application emerged originally 
in Aberdeen Railway Co29 where the court stated that the principle is so strictly 
“adhered to that no question is allowed to be raised as to fairness or unfairness 
of a contract so entered into.” South African courts recognise the strict 
application of the no-conflict rule. 30 
 
Sibex Construction confirmed the pervasiveness of this strict ethic where the 
court stated that the courts should “recognise and strictly enforce the ‘strict 
ethic’ in this area of the law”.31 The court found that the two directors had placed 
                                            
26
 Beuthin 1978 SALJ 461;  Havenga Fiduciary Duties 370.  
27
 Robinson 177 - 8; Transvaal Cold Storage Co Ltd v Palmer 1904 TS 4 (‘Tvl Cold Storage’) 32 
- 4; Magnus Diamond 76; Philips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd  [2004] 1 All SA 150 (SCA) 
(‘Philips v Fieldstone’) 160. 
28
 Blackman Companies para 128. 
29
 Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Bros (1854) 1 Macq 461 (‘Aberdeen Railway Co’) 470; 
Magnus Diamond 76; African Claim and Land Co Ltd v WJ Langermann 1905 TS 494 ( “African 
Claim”) 524. 
30
 Sibex Construction 202; Magnus Diamond  76; Phillips v Fieldstone para [31].  
31
 Sibex Construction 203. The facts were briefly that the applicant’s general manager and 
managing director resigned and formed a rival company which operated in competition with the 
applicant in a highly specialised industry.  Armed with the knowledge gained while employed by 
the applicant, they formed a company to tender for work to be done for Sasol at a price lower 
than that tendered by the applicant.  As to the strict ethics in this area of the law see also 
Magnus Diamond  76. 
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themselves in a position where their interests were in conflict with their duty to 
the applicant and that they were accordingly in breach of their fiduciary duties.32 
 
The acquisition of an opportunity by a director in circumstances under which he 
or she is under a duty to acquire the opportunity on behalf the company, is one 
instance where a director would be regarded as being in breach of his or her 
duty to avoid a conflict of interests.33 
 
A director who, in breach of his or her fiduciary duties as a director, places him- 
or herself in position where his or her duty comes into conflict with his or her 
personal interests, is accountable to the company for any profit made within the 
scope and ambit of his or her duty as a director. 34  Only once it has been 
established that the profits were acquired in circumstances where the personal 
interests of the director came into conflict with his or her duty as a director, will 
the director be prohibited from retaining the ‘secret profit’ made at the expense 
of the company.35 
 
2.2.2 The ‘secret’ or no-profit rule 
 
The no-profit rule36 has its origins in Keech v Sandford,37 an eighteenth century 
English decision involving the breach of a fiduciary duty by a trustee of a trust.  
In Regal (Hastings)38 the rule was applied in the context of company directors 
and has since become the “venerable bedrock governing the liability of 
company directors.”39    
                                            
32
 Sibex Construction 203 – 204. 
33
 African Claim 505; Da Silva 627; Havenga Fiduciary Duties 345. 
34
 Philips v Fieldstone 162; African Claim 505.   
35
 Blackman Companies para [147].  
36
 The no-profit rule is also referred to by some authorities as the secret-profit rule. In this 
dissertation reference to the no-profit rule is a reference to the secret-profit rule. 
37
 Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61; 43 Digest 633 (‘Keech v Sandford) 720. 
38
 Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver 1942 1 All ER 378 (HL) (‘Regal (Hastings)’); Havenga Fiduciary 
Duties 69; Cassim et al Company Law 536. 
39
 Lowry 1994 N Ir Legal Q; Lowry 1998 MLR 516 – 17.  
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In terms of the no-profit rule a director is not allowed to retain any profits he or 
she has made or acquired while acting in the capacity as a director.40  A director 
who makes a profit in breach of his or her fiduciary duty and in his or her 
capacity as a director is, in terms of the no-profit rule, required to account to the 
company for the profits made, failing which he or she is required to repay the 
profits.41  
 
In Dorbyl42 the court applied Regal (Hastings) and held that as a paid executive 
director of the plaintiff company, the defendant had received secret profits in 
breach of his duty of trust.  The profits made by the defendant had to be 
returned to the plaintiff as it was, according to the court, common cause that the 
defendant was a fiduciary when he received the secret profits.43 
 
Where a director has a duty to acquire an opportunity for the company, he or 
she will be required to account for and repay to the company any profits he or 
she may have made by reason of acquiring the opportunity for him- or herself.  
However, for a director to be liable the opportunity must be properly classified 
as a corporate opportunity.44  
 
The corporate-opportunity rule can be distinguished from the no-profit rule on a 
number of grounds. 
 
                                            
40
 Havenga Fiduciary Duties 71ff; Cassim et al Company Law 536. 
41
 Symington 563D-E; Phillips v Fieldstone 162; Da Silva para [18].  
42
 Dorbyl Limited v Vorster [2011] 4 All SA 387 (GSJ) (‘Dorbyl’) 398.  
43
 The facts in Dorbyl were that the plaintiff had, for strategic reasons, resolved to sell off certain 
of its operations.  The defendant, an executive of the plaintiff, participated in the purchase of the 
assets from the plaintiff – the defendant accordingly acted for both the plaintiff (as the seller of 
the assets) and for the purchaser (as buyer of the assets). The defendant received benefits 
totalling R36 million. The court regarded these benefits as an opportunity which that the 
defendant was required to disclose to the plaintiff.  Havenga 2013 TSAR 261 n28 correctly 
criticises the decision on the ground that the court refers to corporate opportunities with 
reference to Da Silva, when in fact the director had not taken an opportunity for himself but had 
profited at the expense of the company. 
44
 Da Silva para [19]. 
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 The no-profit rule is wider in scope than the corporate-opportunity rule as it 
extends to all forms of fiduciary relationship, including commercial fiduciary 
relationships.  The corporate-opportunity rule, on the other hand, only 
applies to commercial fiduciary relationships such as that between a 
director and his or her company.45 
 
 A secret profit is not made at the expense of the company but is obtained 
by reason of and in the course of the director’s office and in his or her 
capacity as a director.46  The no-conflict rule is breached because the 
director, in his or her capacity as a director, has allowed his or her own 
interests to conflict with his or her duty as a director.  The corporate- 
opportunity rule does not depend on the capacity in which the opportunity 
is acquired.47 If an opportunity can be categorised as a corporate 
opportunity then the director is liable even where he or she acquired that 
opportunity in his or her personal capacity.48 
 
 A director who obtains the fully informed consent of the members of a 
company either before or after he or she has made the profit, may retain 
that profit.  Full disclosure of the profit and of the circumstances under 
which it was made is required, and the members must sanction the 
retention of the profit by the director.49  Under the corporate-opportunity 
rule a director cannot retain the opportunity unless the shareholders have 
                                            
45
 Havenga 2007 TSAR 169; Havenga 2013 TSAR 53; Sealy 1962 Cambridge LJ 69.  Non-
commercial relationships refer to the relationships between, for example, an attorney and his 
client, an agent and his principal, or a guardian and his ward.  See Robinson  177 - 8; Phillips  
para [30].  
46
 Havenga 2007 TSAR 169; Havenga 2013 TSAR 258; Austin Fiduciary Accountability 149. 
47
 Havenga 1996 SA Merc LJ 44; Havenga 2007 TSAR 169; Prentice 1967 Modern LR 453; 
Prentice 1974 Modern LR 465; Beck 1975 Canadian Bar R 782. 
48
 Magnus Diamond 76; Havenga Fiduciary Duties 72; Havenga 1996 SA Merc LJ 52; Cassim et 
al Company Law 536; Havenga 2013 TSAR 258. 
49
 African Claim 525; Robinson 178; Philips para [30]; Regal (Hastings) 389; Delport et al 
Henochsberg 280. 
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given him or her their unanimous approval to take the opportunity him- or 
herself.50  
 
Cooks v Deeks51 is an example of the need to obtain unanimous consent from 
the members of the company before acquiring an opportunity.  Three directors 
between them held 75 per cent of the shares in the company.  At a meeting of 
shareholders (of whom the three directors were the majority shareholders) a 
resolution was passed based on the voting power held by the three directors, 
declaring that the company had no interest in a certain contract for the building 
of a railway line.  The court held that directors holding a majority of the voting 
power cannot use this majority to retain a benefit for themselves where the 
benefit belonged to the company.  Such an exercise of voting power would 
allow the majority to supress the minority.52 
 
2.2.3 The corporate-opportunity rule 
 
The corporate-opportunity rule has developed to determine when an opportunity 
should be regarded as a corporate opportunity.53  A director has a duty to 
acquire an opportunity for the company where:54  
 
i) He or she has been given an express or implied mandate to acquire the 
opportunity for the company or to inform the company of its suitability;55 
 
ii) He or she: 
                                            
50
 Canada Safeway Ltd v Thompson (1951) 3 DLR 295, 321; Beuthin 1978 SALJ 462; and 
Cassim et al Company Law 541 refer to Canada Safeway Ltd v Thompson  (1952) 2 DLR 591 
which is an application to settle a judgment.  The dictum of the court is contained in Canada 
Safeway Ltd v Thompson (1951) 3 DLR 295, 321. 
51
Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554; [1916-17] All ER Rep 285 (PC) (‘Cook v Deeks’).  
52
 Cook v Deeks 563ff. 
53
 Beuthin 1978 SALJ 463; Brews 1986 SA Com LJ 4; Havenga Fiduciary Duties 163 
54
 Da Silva para [19]; Delport et al Henochsberg 287; Havenga 1996 SA Merc LJ 53. 
55
 African Claim 518 - 20; Robinson  179; Olifants Tin “B” Syndicate v de Jager 1912 TPD 305. 
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a) either alone or with other directors, is given a general mandate to 
acquire opportunities or to pass opportunities on to the company;56 or 
 
b) so controls the company or those empowered to manage the affairs 
of the company, that the company cannot acquire opportunities or a 
particular opportunity without his or her consent.57 
 
iii) The company is actively pursuing an opportunity or the opportunity 
belongs to the company.58 
 
While this dissertation focuses on the corporate-opportunity rule in South Africa, 
Australia, and England no discussion of the rule is complete with referring to the 
position in the United States where the corporate opportunity rule has its 
origins. 
 
In the US, the corporate-opportunity rule emerged as a separate rule operating 
in addition to, inter alia, the no-conflict and no-profit rules.  The corporate- 
opportunity rule was developed as a separate rule because the duty of loyalty 
could not be applied restrictively in the modern commercial world as restrictive 
application would result in directors being unable to make acquisitions on behalf 
of their corporations.  At issue was that directors frequently serve on multiple 
boards with the result that a director could possibly breach his or her duty of 
loyalty by acting for one company but not for another.59 
 
In South Africa and other Commonwealth countries, the corporate-opportunity 
rule developed to address the difficulty in identifying the circumstances under 
                                            
56
 Magnus Diamond 76; Bellairs v Hodnett 1978 (1) SA 1109 (C) (‘Bellairs’). 
57
 Robinson 196 - 7; Movie Camera Company 308. 
58
 Magnus Diamond 78; Canadian Aero Service Ltd 382. 
59
 Anon 1967 Geo LJ 381; Havenga Fiduciary Duties 163. 
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which an opportunity ought to be classified as a corporate opportunity.60  
Therefore, the crisp issue to be considered – and which has remained elusive – 
is when an opportunity should be regarded as a corporate opportunity.61 Neither 
the no-conflict nor the no-profit rule explains in what circumstances an 
opportunity would, for purposes of a directors’ liability, be regarded as a 
corporate opportunity.62   
 
The no-conflict and no-profit rules emphasise the capacity in which the 
opportunity was acquired, Consequently, a director is in breach if, in his or her 
capacity as a director, he or she acquires an opportunity that belongs to the 
company.  However, where a director acquires an opportunity or becomes 
aware of an opportunity other than in his or her capacity as a director – ie in his 
or her personal capacity – then it is important to identify whether the opportunity 
in question is a corporate opportunity.63    
 
2.2.3.1 The South African approach to corporate opportunities  
 
Early South African cases dealt with corporate opportunity issues in accordance 
with the no-conflict and no-profit rules.64 More recently, South African courts 
have taken cognisance of and applied the corporate-opportunity rule in 
determining whether an opportunity should be classified as a corporate 
opportunity.   
 
The facts in Bellairs are typical of corporate opportunity matters where a 
director appropriates for him- or herself an opportunity belonging to the 
                                            
60
 Brews 1986 SA Com LJ 4; Havenga Fiduciary Duties 354. 
61
 Brusser 1982 SA Co LJ 69; Brews 1986 SA Com LJ 4; Havenga 1996 SA Merc LJ 42; Davies 
Modern Company Law  560 
62
 Beuthin 1978 SALJ 463; Brews 1986 SA Com LJ 4; Davies Modern Company Law 560.  In 
Da Silva paras [18] - [19] the court underscores the importance of categorising an opportunity 
as a corporate opportunity where a company intends claiming the opportunity for itself. 
63
 Beuthin 1978 SALJ 462 - 3; Cartoon 1980 THRHR 68 - 9; Havenga 1996 SA Merc LJ 4 - 43; 
Havenga 2013 TSAR 258, 261. 
64
 See Brusser 1982 SA Com LJ 79; Havenga 1996 SA Merc LJ 52. 
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company.65  Unfortunately, based on the scope of the company’s business as 
determined and agreed by the shareholders and the directors, the court found 
that the opportunity that Bellairs had acquired was not a corporate opportunity.66  
It is submitted that had the court approached the matter on the basis that the 
scope of business must be determined by what the company’s memorandum 
provides, it would in all likelihood,  have arrived at a different decision. 67   
 
According to Brews, the Appellate Division missed a golden opportunity to 
incorporate the corporate-opportunity rule into South African law.  While Brews 
argues that the court could have incorporated some guiding principles regarding 
the definition of a corporate opportunity into South African law, and given the 
nod to some of the tests that have been developed, he nevertheless regards the 
use by the court of concepts such as the ‘scope of business actually carried on’ 
as an indirect victory for the line-of-business test.68      
 
The decision in Spieth v Nagel,69 in the context of the development of the 
corporate-opportunity rule, is important for two reasons.  Firstly, it was the first 
South African decision in which a director was interdicted from continuing to 
exploit a corporate opportunity after having resigned from the company.70  
Secondly and more importantly, the court approved the approach taken in the 
Canadian decision Canadian Aero Services v O’Malley71 in regard to corporate 
                                            
65
 Bellairs concerned a joint venture that was formed to develop certain property as a township. 
One of the joint venture partners, Bellairs, acquired a property adjacent to one of the properties 
owned by the joint venture for himself.  The other partner, Hodnett, sued Bellairs for the profits 
he made in acquiring, developing and disposing of his interests in the particular property.  The 
basis of the claim was that Bellairs had a fiduciary duty to the company and an implied mandate 
to purchase this property for the company, and that in breach of this mandate he had secretly 
bought the property for himself (see the discussion of Bellairs in Brews 1986 SA Com LJ 13ff). 
66
 Bellairs 1128F-G. 
67
 Cartoon 1980 THRHR 71; Brusser 1982 SA Com LJ 78. 
68
 Brews 1986 SA Com LJ 10 and 14.  See also Cartoon 1980 THRHR 71; Brusser 1982 SA 
Com LJ 78. 
69
 Spieth 12.  
70
 Salant 1999 De Rebus 34. 
71
 Canadian Aero Services v O’Malley [1974] SCR 592 (‘Canadian Aero Services’). 
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opportunity matters.72  This endorsement of the Canadian approach marked a 
shift away from the no-conflict and no-profit approach in earlier South African 
decisions.73 
 
Movie Camera marked a further step in the recognition of the corporate- 
opportunity rule in South African law.  The court found, without elaborating on 
the factors, that all the relevant factors must be examined in order to determine 
whether a corporate opportunity belongs to the company.74  The court further 
found that the approach (and factors) laid down by Laskin J in Canadian Aero 
Services v O’Malley75 was a useful staring point in determining whether an 
opportunity belonged to the company.  It is submitted that the fact that the court 
was prepared to apply the corporate-opportunity rule in preference to the 
traditional no-conflict and no-profit approach of the earlier South African 
decisions, indicates a shift towards the corporate-opportunity rule.    
 
From the preceding discussion it can be seen that the corporate-opportunity 
rule has enjoyed the attention of our courts for a number of years.  While 
reference was made in these early decisions to corporate opportunities, no 
attempt was made to explain when an opportunity would be regarded as a 
corporate opportunity.  This task ultimately fell to Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Da Silva.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
72
 The decision is discussed below at para 2.2.3.3.6. 
73
 Salant 1999 De Rebus 34. 
74
 Movie Camera 309 (unfortunately the court did not explain what the relevant factors are). 
75
 According to Laskin J in Canadian Aero Services, neither the conflict test nor the test for 
accountability for profits acquired only by reason of being directors, should be considered as the 
exclusive touchstones of a director’s liability since new factual situations may arise that require 
a reformulation of existing principles. The test and the factors considered by Laskin J are 
discussed at paragraph 2.2.3.3.1 below. 
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2.2.3.2 The Da Silva decision 
 
In the context of the South African law relating to the appropriation of corporate 
opportunities, and more specifically the corporate-opportunity rule, Da Silva is 
important as the Supreme Court of Appeal for the first time elaborated and 
defined the nature and scope of the corporate-opportunity rule.76  Before 
dealing with the court’s treatment of this rule, it is necessary to consider the 
facts of Da Silva specifically in relation to the exploitation of corporate 
opportunities. 
 
The appellant (Da Silva) had, until his resignation, been the managing director 
of the respondent. He resigned so that he could establish a distribution agency 
in competition with the respondent.  The agency was to be conducted through 
two companies (Resinex Plastics and Resinex South Africa). 
 
Da Silva was the managing director of both companies and a shareholder in 
one.  The court was called upon to consider two opportunities, the Resinex and 
the Palstomark opportunities, which the respondent alleged were corporate 
opportunities.77 
 
In regard to the Resinex opportunity, the respondents contended that the Da 
Silva and Resinex NV had entered into a contract in terms of which he would 
establish and head up Resinex NV’s local office.   According to the respondent 
this contract was a corporate opportunity because it was a variant of one that 
the respondent and Resinex NV could have entered into on an earlier occasion.  
Da Silva, however, contended that the opportunity was not a corporate 
                                            
76
 Havenga 2013 TSAR 260.  For a different view on the impact of Da Silva see Cassim 2009 
SALJ 61. 
77
 Da Silva para [13]. 
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opportunity as the contract differed from the one which could have been entered 
into earlier by the respondent and Resinex NV.78     
 
In regard to the Plastomark opportunity, the respondent contended that the 
opportunity to be part of the Dows distribution business was a corporate 
opportunity which Da Silva should have exploited for its benefit.79 
 
Having considered the corporate-opportunity rule the court concluded that 
neither of the opportunities could be considered a corporate opportunity.80  The 
only opportunity that the respondent had pursued in relation to the Resinex 
opportunity was a joint venture which had ultimately not materialised.  Resinex 
NV set up a business in competition with the respondent which put paid to any 
possibility of a joint venture.81 
 
As for the Plastomark opportunity, the court concluded that the decision by Dow 
to sell the distributions part of its business was taken only after Da Silva had left 
the respondents’ employ, and that the decision to sell was unrelated to any 
intervention by Da Silva in breach of his fiduciary duties.82  
 
Having evaluated the Resinex and Plastomark opportunities in accordance with 
the corporate-opportunity rule, the court concluded that neither of the 
opportunities was, in the circumstances, a corporate opportunity.  Although the 
court concluded that neither of the opportunities was a corporate opportunity, 
the judgment remains significant in that the court confirmed the existence of the 
corporate-opportunity rule in South African law by stating that: 
 
                                            
78
 Da Silva para [17]. 
79
 Da Silva para [17]. 
80
 Da Silva paras [35] and [42]. 
81
 Da Silva para [35]. 
82
 Da Silva para [42]. 
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“A consequence of the rule is that a director is in certain circumstances obliged 
to acquire an economic opportunity for the company if it is acquired at all.  Such 
an opportunity is said to be a ‘corporate opportunity’ or one which is the 
property of the company.”83  
 
According to the court, a director would be required to acquire a corporate 
opportunity where he or she:84 
 
 has been given an express or implied mandate to acquire the 
opportunity; 
 is given a general mandate to acquire opportunities or to pass on 
opportunities to the company; 
 so controls the company or those empowered to manage the affairs of 
the company, that the company cannot acquire opportunities or a 
particular opportunity without his or her consent. 85 
 
The court held that directors have a fiduciary duty to exercise their powers in 
good faith and in the best interests of the company, and that as a consequence 
of this rule a director is sometimes required to acquire opportunities for the 
company.86  When a director acquires such an opportunity it is then regarded as 
a 'corporate opportunity' or one which is the 'property' of the company.87  If the 
director acquired the ‘corporate opportunity’ for him- or herself, the acquisition 
would be deemed to have been made for the company and the company would 
be able to claim the opportunity from the delinquent director.  In the alternative, 
and where it was no longer possible to reclaim the opportunity, the company 
would have an alternate claim for any profits which the director may have made 
as a result of his or her breach of duties.88 
                                            
83
 Da Silva para [18]. 
84
 The tests referred to by the court are discussed below at paragraphs 2.2.3.3.1 to 2.2.3.3.4. 
85
 Robinson 196 – 7; Delport et al Henochsberg 287. 
86
 Da Silva para [18]. 
87
 Da Silva para [18]. 
88
 Da Silva para [18]. 
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According to Havenga, Da Silva serves as confirmation that the test that should 
be applied in determining whether a particular opportunity is a corporate 
opportunity is the ‘line-of-business’ test developed in Guth.89  She argues that 
Da Silva provides a clear exposition of the expropriation of a corporate 
opportunity by a director.90 
 
Cassim disagrees with Havenga and is generally critical of the court’s 
judgment.91  Firstly, Cassim argues that the court’s elucidation of the corporate- 
opportunity rule lacks profundity and depth.92  According to Cassim, although 
the court mentioned the tests to establish a corporate opportunity, it failed to 
deal in sufficient detail with the many complexities in this area of the law.93 
 
Secondly, according to Cassim, the opportunity available to the company and 
director respectively, need not be identical for purposes of the corporate- 
opportunity rule.94  Cassim argues that the court should have found that Da 
Silva had usurped a corporate opportunity even though the opportunity 
available to CHC was to enter into a joint venture with Resinex, while the 
opportunity open to Da Silva was to be appointed as managing director of 
Resinex’s South African subsidiaries and to compete with CHC.95  It will be 
seen below that the line-of-business test provides that a director may not usurp 
                                            
89
 Havenga 2013 TSAR 260; Guth v Loft Inc 23 Del Ch 5 A 2d 503 (1939) (‘Guth’).  
90
 Havenga 2013 TSAR 260. 
91
 Cassim 2009 SALJ 61. 
92
 Cassim 2009 SALJ 65. 
93
 Cassim 2009 SALJ 65.  Cassim does not explain what these complexities are but they include 
drawing the line between a director who is required to act in the interest of the company and 
allowing a director to act in his own interets (Brusser 1982 SA Comm LJ 69); determing the 
liability of a director where the company was not pursuing the opportunity that was in the 
company’s line of business; or where, due to financial constrains, a company was unable to 
exploit an opportunity.  As the court pointed out (para [19]) whether an opportunity is a 
corporate opportunity or not is ultimately a question of fact to be determined by reference the 
circumstances of a partiular case.     
94
 Cassim 2009 SALJ 66. 
95
 Cassim 2009 SALJ 66. 
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an opportunity that corresponds to existing or prospective interests or activities 
of the company.96 
 
It is submitted that despite the shortcomings expressed by Cassim, the court did 
provide a framework for the further development of the corporate-opportunity 
rule by laying down the possible tests that can be applied to determine whether 
a particular opportunity is a corporate opportunity.  According to the court an 
opportunity is a corporate opportunity if:97 
 
 it is one which the company was actively pursuing;98 or 
 it falls within the company’s existing or prospective business activities;99 
or 
 it is related to the operations of the company within the scope of 
business;100 or 
 it falls within the company’s line of business.101 
       
2.2.3.3 Maturing the business-opportunity test 
 
In Canadian Aero Services the court found that a director may not usurp for 
him- or herself, or divert to another person or company with whom or which he 
or she is associated, a maturing business opportunity which the company is 
pursuing.102   
 
                                            
96
 See para 2.2.3.6. below. 
97
 Da Silva para [19]. 
98
 Maturing business opportunity test. 
99
 While the court identified four definitions of what constitutes a corporate opportunity, it is 
submitted that this definition is in essence the line-of-business test (see Davies Modern 
Company Law 422). 
100
 Scope -of- business test. 
101
 Line-of-business test. 
102
 Canadian Aero Services 607. 
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In assessing whether, in a particular case, a director had breached his or her 
fiduciary duty when appropriating an opportunity, a number of factor could be 
relevant. These factors, which the court stressed were not to be regarded as 
exhaustive, are the position or office held by the person appropriating the 
opportunity; the nature of the corporate opportunity; its ‘ripeness’; its specificity; 
the director’s relation to the opportunity; his or her knowledge of the opportunity; 
and how the opportunity was obtained.103    
 
2.2.3.4 Opportunity falling within the company’s existing or prospective 
  business activities 
 
The test which the court refers to is discussed in the 7th edition of Davies’s 
Principles of Modern Company Law.104 According to the author, it is unduly 
limiting to classify a corporate opportunity as one which the company was 
actively pursuing as this would not bring all opportunities which come to a 
director’s notice within the scope of his or her duty to disclose the opportunity to 
the company. 
 
Davies suggests that an opportunity falling within the existing or prospective 
business activities of the company should be regarded as a corporate 
opportunity, even where the company has not yet identified the opportunity as 
one it wishes to take up.  While the test will not, according to the author, bring 
all corporate opportunities within the scope of the directors’ duty to disclose the 
opportunity to the company, it would recognise the directors’ duty to promote 
the company’s business as conceived of by senior management from time to 
time. 
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 Canadian Aero Services 620. 
104
 Davies Modern Company Law 422. 
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2.2.3.5 The scope-of-business test 
 
The scope of the company’s business105 test referred to in Bellairs, provides 
that an opportunity may be regarded as a corporate opportunity if it falls within 
the business that the company is actually carrying on, or intends carrying on.  
This is determined not by the so-called ‘cold print’ of the company’s 
memorandum, but by what is agreed by the shareholders and directors to be 
the company’s business.106 Accordingly, unless the opportunity is one which, by 
agreement among and decision of the shareholders and directors, is one which 
the company should pursue, it would not be regarded as a corporate 
opportunity.107 
 
2.2.3.6 The line-of-business test 
  
The line-of-business test referred to in Movie Camera108 and originally 
considered in Guth,109 has been described as the most prominent of the 
corporate-opportunity tests.110  The line-of-business test provides that if an 
opportunity is “so closely associated with the existing business activities” of the 
company” then it is deemed to be a corporate-opportunity.111  The existing 
business opportunities include not only a company’s current business activities 
and interest but also any prospective interests or activities as well as directions 
in which a company may expand.112 
 
                                            
105
 Bellairs 1132F.   
106
 Bellairs 1128. See the criticism of this approach to determining a company’s scope of 
business in Cartoon 1980 THRHR 70 and Brusser 1982 SA Com LJ 77 - 8.  It is submitted that 
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company’s memorandum states its business to be.  
107
 Bellairs 1128G-H.  
108
 Movie Camera 308b. 
109
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110
 Cassim et al Company Law 539; Austin Fiduciary Accountability 154; Scott 2003 MLR 853.  
111
 Movie Camera 308b.  See also Brews 1986 SA Comm LJ 7 and Rosenblum v Judson Eng 
Corp 99 NH 267 at 273 referred to in Brews 1986 SA Comm LJ 7 n14.    
112
 Brews 1986 SA Comm LJ 7. 
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The corporate-opportunity rule as set out by Guth,113 provides that a director 
may not take an opportunity if: the corporation is in a financial position to do so; 
the opportunity falls within the company’s line of business; the opportunity is 
one in which the company has an interest or a reasonable expectation; and the 
director, by taking the opportunity for him- or herself would bring his or her self-
interest into conflict with that of his or her company.114  Commenting on the rule 
in Guth the court, in Broz, noted the factors used to determine whether an 
opportunity is a corporate opportunity are merely guidelines and that no single 
factor is decisive and that all the factors must be taken into account.115 
 
It is submitted that Da Silva should be lauded for having finally acknowledged 
the corporate-opportunity rule as part of South African law.116  Perhaps the 
court could have done more to define the content and scope of the tests, but a 
court deciding on a corporate-opportunity matter in future will find, as a useful 
starting point, the corporate-opportunity tests adopted in Da Silva. 
 
2.2.3.7 Da Silva: A postscript  
 
Dorbyl v Vortser117 is the first decision after Da Silva to refer to the corporate-
opportunity rule.  While the defendant may have profited from his position as 
director by receiving certain benefits from the purchaser, there was certainly no 
diversion of a corporate opportunity belonging to the company, and it can hardly 
be said that the benefits involved the appropriation of a corporate opportunity by 
a director. It is submitted that, based on the facts of the particular case, the 
reference to Da Silva and the corporate-opportunity rule is both unfortunate and 
                                            
113
 Guth para [8].  
114
 Guth para [8]. 
115
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misplaced, and that the matter should have been decided on the basis of the 
no-profit rule.118 
 
It is further submitted that until another court is called upon to consider the 
corporate-opportunity rule, Da Silva will remain the leading South African 
authority on the rule. 
 
The 2008 Companies Act was promulgated shortly after the decision in Da 
Silva.  Da Silva established that in corporate opportunity matters, the corporate-
opportunity rule must be applied.  It is, however, not clear whether the partially 
codified directors’ duties are wide enough to cover corporate opportunity 
matters or whether the corporate-opportunity rule would apply in such cases. 
 
2.3 The 2008 Companies Act  
 
The 2008 Act has resulted in the partial codification of the duties of directors.119  
The partially-codified duties of directors are contained in sections 75 and 76 of 
the 2008 Companies Act.  
 
The need for the partial codification of directors’ duties can be traced to the 
‘Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform’120 published on 23 June 2004. The 
Guidelines note that directors’ duties were found mainly in English cases 
spanning four centuries, and that there was little consensus regarding what the 
content of the fiduciary duties of directors entailed.  Accordingly, it was felt that 
“there is merit in considering a statutory standard” as management and 
directors were not clear about their duties, and a statutory standard for conduct 
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 See Havenga 2013 TSAR 261 n28.  See further the short discussion of Dorbyl in Havenga 
2013 TSAR n43.  
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 Stein & Everingham The New Companies Act 244; Havenga 2013 TSAR 262; Cassim et al 
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and a clear statement of duties would “assist in capturing case law set out in 
other jurisdictions and would give directors a degree of certainty about their 
duties, the standard for their conduct and associated liabilities.”121 
 
The 2008 Companies Act does not refer specifically to ‘corporate opportunity’.  
There are two schools as to whether the provisions of 2008 Companies Act are 
sufficiently wide to include corporate opportunities.  The one school holds that 
the corporate-opportunity rule can be implied from the 2008 Act. 122  The other 
holds that the corporate-opportunity rule is encapsulated in more than one 
provision in the 2008 Act, rather than in any single provision and that the 
provisions must be interpreted in conjunction with the common-law principles.123  
I shall now consider the relevant sections in turn. 
 
Section 75 provides that directors must disclose their personal financial 
interests in respect of matters to be considered at a meeting of the board, or in 
agreements in which the company has a material interest, to the board.124   
While section 75 only envisages disclosure to the board, Havenga argues that a 
director would also have to make disclosure when a company meeting 
considers taking a corporate opportunity and a director is interested in pursuing 
it for him- or herself if the company rejects the opportunity.125   
 
A director who has a personal financial interest in respect of a matter to be 
considered at a meeting of the board, or who knows that a related person has a 
personal financial interest, is required by section 76(5)(a) to disclose both the 
interest and its general nature before the matter is considered by the meeting.  
The director must disclose any material information relating to the matter of 
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which he or she is aware to the meeting,126 and may disclose any observations 
or pertinent insights relating to the matter if requested to do so.127  The director 
may not be present at the meeting and must leave the meeting after making the 
disclosure.128 
 
Where a director has acquired a personal financial interest in an agreement or 
other matter in which the company has a material interest, once the agreement 
or other matter has been approved by the company the director must, in terms 
of section 75(6), promptly disclose to the board or shareholders, the nature and 
extent of his or her financial interest and the material circumstances relating to 
the acquisition of the interest. 
 
Section 76(2)(a) prohibits a director from using his or her positon as director, or 
using any information obtained while acting in that capacity, to  
 
 gain an advantage for him- or herself or another person;129 
 knowingly cause harm to the company of which he or she is a director.130 
 
According to Cassim, section 76(2)(a)(i) and (ii) 131 is wide enough to apply to 
both the no-profit and the corporate-opportunity rules132 as nothing in section 
76(2)(a)((i) and (ii) suggests anything to the contrary.  Cassim’s view is that the 
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statutory duties in section 76(2)(a)(i) and (ii), together with the common-law 
fiduciary duty to avoid a conflict of interests, should reinforce one another.133   
 
Cassim does not substantiate why section 76(2)(a)(i) and (ii) are wide enough 
to encapsulate the corporate-opportunity rule, choosing rather to list the 
requirements that must be satisfied for purposes of the section. Havenga 
disagrees with Cassim that section 76(2)(a)(i) and (ii) encapsulates the 
corporate-opportunity rule.  According to Havenga, situations involving 
corporate opportunities are only partially covered by section 76(2)(a).134  The 
question, therefore, is whether – as suggested by Cassim – section 76(2)(a) is 
wide enough to cover matters involving the appropriation of corporate 
opportunities, or whether – as suggested by Havenga – section 76(2)(a) only 
partially covers corporate opportunity matters.   
 
According to Cassim four requirements must be satisfied in order for section 
76(2)(a)(i) and (ii) to apply. It is required that: 
 
 the defendant must be a director, prescribed officer or alternate, or be de 
facto director or a member of the board or audit committee; 
 the information or the advantage obtained must have come to the 
director while acting in his or her capacity as such, or because of his or 
her position as director; 
 the director must have used his or her position as director, or the 
information obtained in his or her capacity as director, to gain an 
advantage or knowingly cause harm to the company; and 
 the advantage must have been obtained for the director him- or herself or 
for some other person.  
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Havenga argues that to the extent that section 76(2)(a)(i) and (ii) provides that a 
director used his or her position as director, or used information obtained while 
acting in that capacity, to gain an advantage or to knowingly cause harm to the 
company, corporate-opportunities are only partially covered.  This is because 
these limitations do not apply to corporate opportunity matters.135 
 
It is submitted that a director who uses information to acquire a corporate 
opportunity and in so doing gains an advantage for him- or herself, may be said 
to be appropriating a corporate opportunity.  In this light section 76(2)(a)(i) and 
(ii) does appear to cover corporate opportunities.   Havenga’s interpretation that 
section 76(2)(a) only partially covers corporate opportunity matters, therefore, 
would appear to be correct.   
 
Havenga argues that instead of corporate opportunities falling under only one 
specific section of the 2008 Act, a number of provisions could in fact apply to 
corporate opportunity matters.136  These provisions will now be considered.  
 
Section 76(2)(b) provides that a director must communicate any information that 
comes to his or her attention at the earliest practicable opportunity, unless he or 
she believes that the information is not material to the company, is generally 
available to the public, is known to the other directors, or he or she is bound not 
to disclose the information by reason of a legal or ethical obligation of 
confidentiality.  In terms of the common law, if a company is not financially able 
to take up an opportunity, or does not wish to do so, a director is still regarded 
as having breached his or her fiduciary duty if he or she appropriates that 
corporate opportunity.137 According to Havenga, under these circumstances a 
director could believe the information to be immaterial.138 
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Section 76(3) 139 restates the important fiduciary duty requiring a director to act 
in good faith, for a proper purpose,140 and in the best interests of the 
company.141  The director’s duty to take up a corporate opportunity for the 
company and not for him- or herself, falls broadly within the scope of the duty to 
act in good faith and in the best interests of the company. Accordingly, section 
76(3) could be said to contain a partial codification of the corporate-opportunity 
rule. 142     
 
The common law has not been excluded by the 2008 Companies Act.  Section 
77(2)(a) makes this clear by stating that the director of a company may be held 
liable in accordance with the principles of common law for breach of a fiduciary 
duty as a consequence of a breach of section 76(2) or (3)(a) or (b).  The partial 
codification falls short of providing an all-inclusive statement of duties, and 
creates uncertainty, especially as regards the scope and ambit of the corporate-
opportunity rule.  To this end the common law will continue to play a role in the 
development of the corporate-opportunity rule. 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have reviewed, first, how the common law deals with matters 
involving the appropriation of a corporate opportunity. In particular, I considered 
                                            
139
 Section 76(3)(a) and (b) provides that a director of a company, when acting in that capacity, 
must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director:  
“(a) in good faith and for a proper purpose; 
(b) in the best interests of the company”. 
140
 2008 Act s 76(3)(a). 
141
 2008 Act s 76(3)(b) and see also 7 - 8 above. 
142
 Havenga 2013 TSAR 266 notes that one of the categories of a director’s duty to act in the 
best interests of the company is the obligation to take up a corporate opportunity for the 
company’s benefit and not for personal gain.
 
The equivalent provision in the Australian 
Corporations Act is s 182 and in the UK Companies Act s 175.  These provisions are 
considered below. 
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the tests referred to in Da Silva for determining whether a specific opportunity 
should be regarded as a corporate opportunity in its peculiar circumstances. 
 
Secondly, I considered whether the 2008 Companies Act provides for matters 
involving the appropriation of corporate opportunities.  It was shown that 
although the Act makes no specific reference to corporate opportunities, 
matters involving the appropriation of corporate opportunities are partially 
encapsulated by section 76(3) which provides that a director is required to act in 
the best interests of the company.  A director acts in the best interests of the 
company if he or she acquires an opportunity for the company. 
 
Regrettably, the 2008 Act does not explain when an opportunity is to be 
regarded as a corporate opportunity.  In the absence of any specific reference 
in the 2008 Companies Act to the circumstances under which an opportunity will 
be regarded as a corporate opportunity, Da Silva will continue to provide the 
rules and principles by which corporate opportunity matters are decided.   
 
Da Silva explained the various tests that a court can apply when called upon to 
determine whether a particular opportunity may be regarded as a corporate 
opportunity.  According to Da Silva, once it has been established that an 
opportunity is a corporate opportunity, the question as to whether the company 
could take up the opportunity becomes irrelevant.  This is a reiteration of the 
strict approach adopted in Regal (Hastings) and Philips, which provides that 
directors are liable even where the company is not in a position to take up the 
opportunity for itself.   
 
It is submitted that while the court in Da Silva could have done more to explain 
the content of the tests, it has, at the very least, laid the groundwork for the 
further development of the corporate-opportunity rule. Whether or not an 
opportunity is or is not a corporate opportunity is ultimately a question of fact to 
be determined after a careful examination of all the factors in a particular case. 
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The approach of the Australian and English courts to matters involving the 
appropriation of corporate opportunities could serve as a useful guide to the 
future approach of the South African courts – especially as both the Australian 
and the English courts have dealt with corporate opportunity matters post- 
codification.  The position in these two jurisdictions will therefore be considered 
and compared to the position in South Africa in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
The Business-Opportunity Rule in Australia 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In Omnilab143 the court stated that the business-opportunity doctrine144 is 
“…well-established in Australia, having been applied in a number of authorities 
including the decision in Mordecai v Mordecai (1988) 12 NSWLR 58 at 65…”.   
 
Despite this statement in Omnilab, matters involving the appropriation of 
business opportunities continue to be adjudicated on the basis of the no-profit 
rule.145 This may be because the business-opportunity rule is regarded as no 
more than an application of the no-profit rule where the profit takes the form of 
exploiting a business opportunity that is in line with the company’s existing or 
prospective business.146 
 
In this chapter I first consider how Australian courts have approached matters 
involving the appropriation of business opportunities following the partial 
codification of directors’ duties.  Secondly, I consider whether the Australian 
Corporations Act includes a business-opportunity rule.    Lastly, I evaluate the 
differences and similarities between the South African and Australian 
approaches to matters involving business opportunities. 
 
 
 
                                            
143
 Omnilab Media Pty Ltd and Another v Digital Cinema Network Pty Ltd (2012) 285 ALR 65 
(‘Ominilab’) para [217]. 
144
 In Australian law the corporate-opportunity rule is sometimes referred to as the business- 
opportunity doctrine or business-opportunity rule.   
145
 Austin, Ford & Ramsay Company Directors 368 para 9.4; Leibler Taking a Chance 14 and 
18. 
146
 Austin, Ford & Ramsay Company Directors 368 para 9.4. 
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3.2 The business-opportunity rule  
 
The received law in Australia where a director appropriates a business 
opportunity for him- or herself, is constituted by the decisions of the House of 
Lords in Phipps v Boardman and Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver. 147  From 
these two cases it emerges that where a director appropriates an opportunity 
belonging to the company for him- or herself, the director must account to the 
company for the profit or benefit made if:  
 
 the profit or benefit was obtained in a situation where there was a conflict 
or possible conflict between the director’s duty toward the company and 
his or her personal interest; or 
 the profit or benefit was obtained, by reason of his or her position as a 
director; or 
 the profit or benefit was obtained by reason of his or her taking 
advantage of an opportunity or knowledge derived from his or her 
position as a director.148 
 
Austin considers the business-opportunity rule to be no more than a specific 
application of the no-profit rule in matters where the profit takes the form of the 
exploitation of a business opportunity which falls within a company’s line of 
business.149  The no-profit rule makes liability dependent on the existence of a 
causal link between the profit made and use of fiduciary office when making that 
profit or appropriating the opportunity.150  In the case of the no-profit rule, the 
                                            
147
 Natural Extracts Pty Ltd v Glendon Micheal Stotter NG 3192 of 1992 (‘Natural Extracts’).  
148
 Natural Extracts 45. 
149
 Austin, Ford & Ramsay Company Directors 362; Cuerden 2012 Brief  28. 
150
 Streeter v Western Areas Exploration (no 2) (2011) 278 ALR 291 (‘Streeter’) para [387]; 
Dawson v Crystal Finance para [415]; Austin Fiduciary Accountability 149; Liebler Taking a 
Chance 19. 
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causal link is that the profit or opportunity must have been obtained by virtue of 
the directors’ position.151   
 
The no-profit rule emphasises the capacity in which the director acquired the 
opportunity in question.  Unfortunately, the no-profit rule’s emphasis on the 
capacity in which a director acquires an opportunity, does not address situations 
in which a director appropriates an opportunity belonging to the company in his 
personal capacity. 
 
In order to overcome the no-profit rule’s emphasis on capacity, Austin 
recommends an extended line-of-business test to determine whether, in the 
specific circumstances, an opportunity can be classified as a business 
opportunity.152  While some Australian decisions have referred to the line-of- 
business test suggested by Austin, a business-opportunity doctrine distinct from 
the no-conflict and no-profit rules has yet to be universally adopted.153   
 
The expanded line-of-business test suggested by Austin provides that a 
business opportunity is any opportunity to engage in a business activity of which 
a serving executive becomes aware under circumstances where he or she 
knows, or should have known, that:  
 the opportunity in question is related to the corporation’s business; or 
 the corporation may reasonably be expected to engage in the line of 
business.154    
 
                                            
151
 EC Dawson Investments (Pty) Ltd v Crystal Finance (Pty) Ltd [No 3] [2013] WASC 183 para 
[416] (‘EC Dawson’).  
152
 Austin Fiduciary Accountability 161; Liebler Taking a Chance 18. 
153
 Cuerden 2012 Brief 28.  Some of the pre-2001 Corporations Act cases in which the 
business-opportunity rule was considered include SEA Food International v Lam (1998) 16 
ACLC 552; Dwyer v Lippiatt (2004) 50 ACSR 33; and Natural Extracts Pty Ltd v Stotter (1997) 
24 ACSR 110. 
154
 Austin Fiduciary Accountability 157. The line-of-business test applied in Da Silva and Movie 
Camera provides that an opportunity is a corporate opportunity if it is in the contemplation of the 
parties and corresponds to the existing or prospective interests or activities the company. 
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As the discussion of a few decisions involving the appropriation of business 
opportunities following the partial codification of directors’ duties by the 
Australian Corporations Act will show, the application of the business-
opportunity doctrine by Australian courts remains inconsistent.155 These 
decisions will now be considered. 
 
The Federal Court of Australia recognised the existence of a business- 
opportunity rule in Omnilab.156  According to the court, the principle that a 
director may not usurp or divert a maturing business opportunity which his or 
her company is actively pursuing, is well established in Australia.157  The court 
further noted that, while the court a quo had decided the matter on the basis of 
the broader conflict of interest and profit rules, nothing precluded a finding that 
the breach of duty involved a breach of the business-opportunity rule.158  Lastly, 
the court noted that the scope of DCN’s business (the applicant in the matter) 
was the same as that of Omnilab (the respondent) and that this was sufficient to 
show that the director was in breach of his fiduciary duties.159   
 
One of the issues that the court was called upon to decide in Streeter related to 
the liability of a fiduciary to account for a profit derived from a 'corporate 
opportunity’.160  While the parties to the appeal did not contend for a business- 
opportunity rule different to or separate from the conflict or profit rules,161 the 
court nevertheless acknowledged the existence of the business-opportunity 
                                            
155
 See generally Austin et al Australian Corporate Law 32,294; Ford Principles 462.  Part of the 
reason for the inconsistent application of the business-opportunity rule might, as Liebler 
suggests, “be an attempt to remain loyal to the foundations of equity’s framework for dealing 
with breaches of fiduciary duty.” Also see Liebler Taking a Chance 19.   
156
 Omnilab para [217]. 
157
 Omnilab para [217]. See para 2.2.3.3 above. The maturing business opportunity test 
provides that the company must be actively pursuing an opportunity for the opportunity to be 
categorised as a business opportunity.  
158
 Omnilab para [219]. 
159
 Omnilab para [228]. 
160
 Streeter para [409]. 
161
 Streeter para [442]. 
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rule.162  It noted that while it was necessary precisely to identify the nature of 
the opportunity that was said to have been diverted, it was preferable to focus 
on the precise circumstances from which the liability arose – that is the capacity 
in which the opportunity was acquired – rather than using a descriptor like 
“diversion of corporate opportunity”.163     
 
A view differing from that in Omnilab and Streeter, was expressed by the New 
South Wales Supreme Court in Barescape.164 Here the court rejected the 
existence of a business-opportunity rule and stated that the applicable 
principles for dealing with claims involving the taking of corporate opportunities 
are the no-conflict and no-profit rules.165  However, while rejecting the business- 
opportunity rule, the court nevertheless applied the line-of-business test in order 
to find that there had been a breach of the no-profit rule.166 
 
More recently the Western Australia Supreme Court was required, in EC 
Dawson,167 to consider whether a former director (Coombs) of a liquidated 
company (FRC) had breached his fiduciary duty by taking a finance broking 
business opportunity which fell within the scope of FRC’s line of business.  
Although the court found it unnecessary to decide whether there was a separate 
business-opportunity rule wider in scope than the no-profit rule, the court 
nevertheless applied the line-of-business test to determine whether the 
opportunity in question fell within the scope of FRCs business.168 In the 
circumstances the court concluded that the opportunity in question did not fall 
within the scope of FRC’s line of business.  According to the court a separate 
                                            
162
 Streeter paras [78] and [441]. 
163
 Streeter paras [458] and [465].   
164
 Barescape Pty Limited v Bacchus Holdings Pty Limited [2012] NSWSC 984 (‘Barescape’). 
165
 Barescape para [148]. 
166
 Barescape para [149].   
167
 EC Dawson Investments Pty Ltd v Crystal Finance Ltd [No 3] [2013] WASC 183 (‘EC 
Dawson’). 
168
 EC Dawson para [485]. 
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business-opportunity rule would not afford the plaintiff greater rights than those 
available under the no-conflict and no-profit rules.169   
 
What emerges from this overview of Australian cases is that, firstly, unlike the 
position in South Africa, there are divergent views regarding the business- 
opportunity rule as a rule distinct from the no-profit and no-conflict rules, and 
that the development of a separate business-opportunity rule is at best 
haphazard. Secondly, although the decisions indicate divergent views regarding 
a separate business-opportunity rule, the line-of-business test is nevertheless 
applied when determining whether, for purposes of the no-profit rule, an 
opportunity falls within a company’s scope of business.  It is submitted that in 
this regard the position may be said to be similar to the South African position. 
 
Despite this divergence of views on the existence of a distinct business- 
opportunity doctrine, Austin opines that while the business-opportunity doctrine 
is no more than an application of the no-profit rule, it can nevertheless be 
identified as a separate rule.170  This is because once it is shown that an 
opportunity that has been diverted falls within the company’s line of business, it 
becomes unnecessary to show that the diversion of the opportunity was the 
result of the director’s misuse of his or her position.  The mere fact that the 
opportunity was diverted would then be sufficient to find the director liable 
without any need to show a causal connection between the opportunity and the 
office occupied by the director.171 
 
3.3 The Corporations Act 
 
The codified duties of directors are contained in sections 180 to 184 of the 
Australian Corporations Act. 
                                            
169
 EC Dawson para [410]. 
170
 Austin, Ford & Ramsay Company Directors 362.  
171
 Austin, Ford & Ramsay Company Directors 362. 
40 
 
 
The provisions of the Australian Corporations Act are very similar to the 
provisions of the 2008 Companies Act. Section 181 of the Australian 
Corporations Act can be regarded as the counterpart of section 76(3)(a) and (b) 
of the 2008 Companies Act. 
 
Not only is the wording of the sections dealing with directors’ duties in the 2008 
Companies Act and the Australian Corporations Act similar, a further similarity 
is that, like the provisions of the 2008 Companies Act, neither section 181 nor 
section 182 of the Australian Corporations Act contains a specific reference to a 
business-opportunity rule. 
 
The arguments of Cassim and Havenga around section 76(2)(a)(i) and (ii) and 
section 76(3) of the 2008 Companies Act, apply equally to sections 181 and 182 
of the Australian Corporations Act.  Accordingly, the corporate-opportunity rule 
will either be implied from a particular section, or is encapsulated in more than 
one section of the Australian Corporations Act.172 The provisions of the 
Australian Corporations Act are now considered and discussed.       
 
Section 181173 of the Australian Corporations Act, like section 76 of the 2008 
Companies Act, applies to directors and other officers of a corporation.  
Directors are required to discharge their duties and exercise their powers in 
good faith, in the best interests of the corporation, and for a proper purpose.  
These provisions are virtually identical to the provisions of section 76(3)(a) and 
(b) of the 2008 Companies Act.  
 
                                            
172
 See page 26 above for the two schools of thought on the corporate opportunity rule.  
173
 “A director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and discharge their 
duties: 
 (a)  in good faith in the best interests of the corporation; and 
 (b)  for a proper purpose.” 
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The provisions of section 182174 are similar to those of section 76(2) of the 2008 
Companies Act.  Section 182 of the Australian Corporations Act expressly 
provides for that which is, by implication, embodied in section 181.  Accordingly, 
a director would be in breach of section 181 if he or she improperly used his or 
her position to gain an advantage for him- or herself, or for someone else, or 
caused detriment to the corporation.   
 
Section 182 is regarded as the statutory version of the common-law duty of a 
director to avoid a conflict of interests.175  According to the authors of Business 
Corporations, a director uses his or her position as director improperly for 
purposes of section 182 if he or she does not act in the best interests of the 
company.176  According to Austin,177 the word ‘improper’ in section 182 must be 
understood in its commercial context and refers to conduct which is inconsistent 
with the discharge of a director’s duties, obligations, and responsibilities. 
 
While there is no common and uniform standard as to what is regarded as 
‘improper’ use of his or her position by a director, Austin suggests that the term 
should be determined by reference to the common-law duties of the particular 
officer concerned – in other words, reference should be made to the common-
law principles and rules.178  In Business Corporations the authors suggest that a 
director who exploits a business opportunity that the company had considered 
pursuing, may be using his or her position improperly and would be in breach of 
his or her fiduciary duties if a sufficient connection exists between his or her 
obligation as a director and the specific profit-making opportunity.179    
                                            
174 
“A director, secretary, other officer or employee of a corporation must not improperly use 
 their position to: 
 (a)  gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or 
 (b) cause detriment to the corporation”. 
175
 Fitzpatrick Business Corporations 548 para [10.75]. 
176
 See above page 30 for the discussion of s 76(3). 
177
 Austin, Ford & Ramsay Company Directors 382 para [9.16]. 
178
 Austin, Ford & Ramsay Company Directors 382.   
179
 Fitzpatrick Business Corporations Law 548 para [10.75]; see also Goss 2007 Mondaq 1. 
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Section 182 (and its predecessor)180 have been applied in situations where an 
employee has diverted business away from his or her company to a company 
he or she has established,181 and where an officer solicited customers of the 
company he or she was employed by for a separate business that he or she 
intended establishing.182 If one considers the circumstances under which 
section 182 (and its predecessor) have been applied, it is submitted that the 
business-opportunity rule could be said to be implied in the section.183   
 
Section 185 of the Australian Corporations Act contains a provision similar to 
that contained in section 77(2)(a) and provides that section 182 and 184 have 
effect “in addition to, and not in derogation of, any rule of law” that relates to the 
duties or liability of a director.  In determining whether in a particular matter an 
opportunity is a business opportunity, the existing common-law rules will, as in 
South African law, continue to apply.    
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
What emerges from this discussion is, firstly, that Australian courts have been 
inconsistent in adopting and applying a business-opportunity rule which is 
separate and distinct from the no-profit rule.  Rather, when confronted with 
matters involving the diversion or exploitation of business opportunities, the 
courts turn to the no-conflict and no-profit rules.184   
 
                                            
180
 Austin, Ford & Ramsay Company Directors 386. 
181
 Digital Pulse Pty Ltd v Harris (2002) 40 ASCR 487. 
182
 Forkserve Pty Ltd v Jack and Aussie Forklift Repairs Pty Ltd (2000) 19 ACLC 299. 
183
 See Austin & Ramsay Corporations Law 474. 
184
 Liebler Taking a Chance 14. The reason for continued application of the no-profit rule may 
be that under the no-profit rule no enquiry is required into the nature of the opportunity.  The 
only enquiry is whether the director acquired the opportunity by reason of and in the course of 
his or her office. If he or she did he or she is liable to account for any profit made as a result of 
acquiring the opportunity. Any opportunity that a director acquires by reason of or in the course 
of his or her office may result in liability under the no profit rule.  See also Austin, Ford & 
Ramsay Fiduciary Accountability 159.      
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Secondly, Australian courts continue to adjudicate business opportunity issues 
on the basis of the no-conflict and no-profit rules.  However in doing so the line- 
of-business test is applied which, it is submitted, would indicate that there is at 
least some recognition of a need adequately to explain when an opportunity is 
to be categorised as a business opportunity.185   It is submitted that in applying 
a line-of-business test, the Australian position is not dissimilar to that in South 
Africa.  
 
In so far as the provisions of the Corporations Act are concerned, sections 181 
and 182 are very similar to sections 76(2) and (3)(a) and (b) of the 2008 
Companies Act.186  While there have been no significant Australian decisions on 
the business-opportunity rule or section 182, Austin is of the view that a close 
correlation exists between the statutory and general fiduciary duties.187 It is 
submitted that given the fact that the 2008 Companies Act does not directly 
refer to corporate opportunities, South African courts would, much the same as 
suggested by Austin, continue to apply the common-law principles set out in Da 
Silva when interpreting the statutory provisions.   
                                            
185
 Austin, Ford & Ramsay Company Directors 362.  
186
 Austin, Ford & Ramsay Company Directors 382ff; Harris, Hargovan & Adams Australian 
Corporate Law 509.  
187
 Austin, Ford & Ramsay Company Directors 393. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Corporate-Opportunity Doctrine in England 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Because of its adoption in a number of English and Anglo-Commonwealth 
cases, Regal (Hastings) has come to be viewed as the “venerable bedrock 
governing the liability of company directors.”188  The rule in Regal (Hastings) 
provides that the liability of a director is not dependent on the breach of his or 
her fiduciary duty, but on his or her having made a profit or acquired an 
opportunity by reason of – and only by reason of – his or her position as a 
director of the company.189  For purposes of liability, it does not matter that the 
company was unable to acquire the opportunity itself since liability depends on 
the capacity in which the opportunity was obtained or the profit made.190   
 
The traditional English approach, which holds a director liable for usurping an 
opportunity if the opportunity is acquired in his or her capacity as a director, fails 
to address what constitutes a corporate opportunity.191  While matters involving 
the appropriation of corporate opportunities continue to be decided on the basis 
of the no-conflict and no-profit rules, a few English decisions have applied the 
line-of-business test to determine liability.192 
 
                                            
188
 Lowry 1998 MLR 516 – 17. 
189
 Regal (Hastings) 395; Keay Directors’ Duties 315 – 16. 
190
 Regal (Hastings) 395; Gencor ACP Limited v Dalby [2000] EWHC 1560 (Ch) para [17]; Keay 
Directors Duties 316. 
191
 Keay Directors’ Duties 336; Davies Modern Company Law 560 and 566; Dobie 2008 Trinity 
CLR 25. 
192
 Wilkinson v West Coast Capital [2005] EWHC 3009 (Ch); (2007) BCC 717 para [290]; 
O’Donnell v Shanahan [2008] EWHC 1973 (Ch) ; Keay Directors’ Duties 339; Davies Modern 
Company Law 566; Lowry 2012 IRL 10 - 11.  
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In this chapter I first reflect on recent English decisions involving the diversion of 
corporate opportunities to establish the English common-law approach to the 
diversion of corporate opportunities.  Secondly, I consider the codified duties of 
directors under the UK Companies Act.  Lastly, and by way of a conclusion, the 
similarities and differences between the position in the UK and South Africa are 
considered. 
 
4.2 The corporate-opportunity rule 
 
English courts traditionally approach matters involving the appropriation of a 
corporate opportunity on the basis of the no-profit rule.193  Under the no-profit 
rule a director is required to account to the company for any profit made as a 
result of him or her appropriating an opportunity by reason or use of his or her 
position as director.194  The aim of the rule is to ensure that a director does not 
misuse his or her position for personal advantage.  
 
The fact that an opportunity falls outside the scope of a company’s business is 
irrelevant for purposes of the no-profit rule.195  The only enquiry is whether the 
opportunity came to the director by virtue or use of his or her position as a 
director.  The rule is both inflexible and strict and situates any opportunity a 
director appropriates within the scope of the rule.  However, despite this strict 
adherence to the no-profit rule, there are some decisions where the scope of 
the company’s business has been considered – albeit in the context of the no- 
conflict or no-profit rules.  These decisions are considered below.  
 
One of the issues that fell to be considered in Commonwealth Oil and Gas 
Company (‘COGC’) was whether the opportunity that had been exploited by the 
                                            
193
 Kershaw 2005 Legal Studies 537 - 40; Keay Directors’ Duties 336; Davies Modern Company 
Law 560 and 566; Dobie 2008 Trinity CLR 25. 
194
 Mortimer Company Directors 313. 
195
 Mortimer Company Directors 326. 
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director fell within the company’s line of business.  The facts, briefly, were that 
Baxter, a non-executive director of COGC, diverted to another company 
(Eurasia) of which he was a substantial shareholder, director, and president, an 
opportunity in terms of which Eurasia was granted a twelve month exclusive 
right to negotiate the terms for the possible exploration and development of an 
oil exploration block.  According to the court, the opportunity that Baxter had 
diverted was one which would have been of interest and commercially attractive 
to COGC.196  The court confirmed that the company’s line of business was one 
of the issues to consider in determining whether, by diverting an opportunity, 
there had been a conflict between the directors’ interests and those of the 
company.197    
 
The maturing-business test was applied by the court in Foster Bryant.198  The 
company alleged that Bryant, a director of the company, had diverted a 
business opportunity from the company which had resulted in Bryant putting 
himself in a position of conflict with the company.  On the facts, however, the 
court concluded that the director had not breached his duty to avoid a conflict of 
interests because the opportunity in question was not a maturing business 
opportunity.199  The opportunity that the company alleged the director had 
usurped was an opportunity to provide services to a particular client.  Bryant 
had been forced out of the company by the other director, and had been offered 
a position with the client. The client, however, was not interested in dealing only 
with the company and wanted to deal with both Bryant and the other director.  
The other director was, however, not amenable to this arrangement.  On this 
basis the court found there to be no maturing business opportunity.   
 
                                            
196
 Commonwealth Oil and Gas Company Limited v Baxter and another [2007] CSOH 198 para 
[188] (‘Commonwealth Oil and Gas’). 
197
 Commonwealth Oil and Gas paras [185] and [186]. 
198
 Foster Bryant Surveying Ltd v Bryant [2007] EWCA Civ 200 (‘Foster Bryant’). 
199
 Foster Bryant para [89]. 
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Thermascan200 involved a restraint application and the diversion of a corporate 
opportunity.  At paragraph [14] the court confirmed the submissions made by 
the parties that the provisions of the UK Companies Act dealing with the 
fiduciary duties of a director set out in section 175, did not alter the pre-existing 
law, which it proceeded to summarise201 – this despite the provision in section 
170(5) of the UK Companies Act which provides that the codified duties have 
“effect in place of the common-law rules and equitable principles.”  In regard to 
the liability of a director, the court confirmed the principles set out in Foster v 
Bryant that a director who acquires a maturing business opportunity sought by 
the company in circumstances which led him or her to the opportunity, would be 
in breach of his or her duty not to place personal interests before those of the 
company.  Accordingly, while the court considered the nature of the opportunity, 
the emphasis remained on the capacity in which the director obtained the 
opportunity.    
 
The codification of the no-conflict rule by section 175 of the UK Companies Act 
was confirmed in Eastford.202  The court noted that that both Boardman and 
Bhullar (which are both pre-codification authorities on the appropriation of 
corporate opportunities) remain relevant to the interpretation of section 
175(1).203  It is submitted that while section 175(1) contains a codification of the 
conflict rule, the applicable principles will still derive from the common law. 
 
The facts in Futurist Developments204 are fairly complicated and do not warrant 
discussion for present purposes.  What is important is that at paragraph [40] the 
                                            
200
 Thermascan Limited v Norman [2009] EWHC 3694 (Ch) (‘Thermascan’). 
201
 Thermascan para [14]. 
202
 Eastford Limited v Thomas Graham Gillespie, Airdrie North Limited [2010] CSOH 132 
(‘Eastford’) para [17]. 
203
 Eastford para [18]. 
204
 Lee v Futurist Developments Limited [2010] EWHC 2764 (Ch) (‘Futurist Developments’). 
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court confirmed that there was a duty on a director not to divert, for his or her 
benefit or the benefit of a third party, a maturing business opportunity.205 
 
The relevance of the terms in which the statutory duties had been framed was 
considered in Towers.206 According to the court, the codified duties “extracted 
and expressed the essence of the rules and principles which they replaced”.  
Applying the strict approach of earlier cases such as Regal (Hastings), the court 
found that a director who obtains a business opportunity for him- or herself 
would be liable regardless of the fact that he or she acted in good faith, or that 
the company could not, or would not, take advantage of the opportunity.207   
  
Sharma v Sharma208 involved an appeal against a decision that a director of a 
dental company was not in breach of her fiduciary or statutory duties when she 
acquired certain dental practices for her own benefit rather than for the benefit 
of the company.  The company concerned was a family-owned dental business 
of which the appellant and the respondents were the shareholders.  The court 
confirmed the codification of directors’ duties in section 175 of UK Companies 
Act, and accepted that there was no material difference between the statutory 
duties under section 175 and the pre-existing fiduciary duties.209  In applying 
section 175 the court held that the statutory duty imposed by section 175 
provides that: 
 
“A company director is in breach of his fiduciary or statutory duties if he exploits 
for his personal gain (a) opportunities which come to his attention through his 
role as director or (b) any other opportunities which he could and should exploit 
for the benefit of the company.” 
 
                                            
205
 An opportunity is regarded as a maturing business opportunity in that the opportunity in 
question is being actively pursued by the company. (See Lowry 2012 IRL 11.)   
206
 Towers v Premier Waste Management Ltd [2012] BCC 72 (‘Towers’). 
207
 Towers paras [10] - [11]. 
208
 Sharma v Sharma [2013] All ER (D) 291 (‘Sharma’). 
209
 Sharma para [51]. 
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It is submitted that the preceding discussion shows that while the approach to 
corporate opportunity matters remains the no-conflict and no-profit rules, the 
question of whether an opportunity falls within a company’s line of business or 
is a maturing business opportunity, is a factor to be considered when 
determining liability.210  The approach of the English courts remains strict.  Once 
it has been shown that an opportunity falls within a company’s line of business 
or is a maturing business opportunity, a director is liable either in terms of the 
no-conflict or no-profit rule.  It is then irrelevant that the company was not in a 
position to take up the opportunity.211 
 
4.3 The UK Companies Act 2006  
 
In contrast to the 2008 Companies Act and the Australian Corporations Act 
which only partially codified the duties of directors, the UK Companies Act 
contains an extensive codification of directors’ duties.  The Commission 
appointed to draft the UK Companies Act took the view that principles relating to 
the duties of directors were difficult to find and understand because they were 
available mainly in case law that had developed the principles over many years. 
Accordingly, in drafting the sections dealing with the duties of directors, the 
Commission opted for a comprehensive statement of directors’ duties so as to 
make these duties more accessible and easily understood.  
 
The UK Companies Act stands on an altogether different footing to the 2008 Act 
and the Australian Corporations Act when it comes to the duties of directors.  In 
terms of section 170(3) of the UK Companies Act, the codified directors’ duties 
apply in place of the common-law rules and principles.212 This contrasts with the 
                                            
210
 See the discussion in Hannigan Company Law 281ff.  
211
 Hannigan Company Law 281 and 284. 
212
 Section 170(3):  
“The general duties are based on certain common law rules and equitable principles as 
they apply in relation to directors and have effect in place of those rules and principles 
as regards the duties owed to a company by a director.”  
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position both in South Africa and in Australia where the duties of directors have 
only been partially codified by the respective Acts, and where the common law 
has not been excluded.213 
 
While the duties apply in preference to the common-law rules and principles, 
the corresponding common-law principles and rules must be considered when 
applying and interpreting the general statutory duties.214  This implies that the 
law, as it developed before codification, will continue to be applied in 
interpreting and applying the general statutory duties.215   
 
Section 175 of the UK Companies Act, which deals with conflicts of interest, 
refers specifically to the exploitation of a corporate opportunity by a director.216  
Section 175(2), which provides that a director must avoid any conflict of 
interests when he or she exploits a corporate opportunity, is regarded as a 
statutory version of the common-law no-conflict rule.217 
 
Dobbie argues that because in terms of section 175(2) it is immaterial whether 
or not the company was in a position to take advantage of the opportunity, the 
common-law rule with all its resultant inadequacies has been maintained.218     
   
                                            
213
 Havenga 2013 TSAR 257 n1; Jordan 2009 Melbourne Univ Law R 639 – 40.  
214
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“The general duties shall be interpreted and applied in the same way as common law 
rules or equitable principles, and regard shall be had to the corresponding common law 
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[2012] 1 BCLC 67 CA [5]; Keay Directors’ Duties 339; Mortimer Company Directors 316; and 
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  the property, information or opportunity)”. 
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 Davies Modern Company Law 559. 
218
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Directors 322. 
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The UK Companies Act provides that the duty applies only where there is a 
conflict or possible conflict of interests with the company.  This is, in essence, a 
statutory version of the common-law no-conflict rule.  Because of the proviso 
that it is “immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the … 
opportunity” courts will, according to Dobbie, still be unable to adopt the 
corporate-opportunity rule and the strict no-conflict and no-profit rules will 
continue to be applied.219 
 
While section 175 provides that a director must avoid a conflict between his or 
her own and the company’s interests – particularly in relation to the exploitation 
of opportunities – the section does not define what would be regarded as an 
opportunity. According to Lowry, if the intention of the codification was to 
achieve consistency and coherence, then the drafting of section 175 was 
possibly informed by the reasoning in Bhullar v Bhullar in which the line-of- 
business test was adopted.220 
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
From the discussion in this chapter it appears that while courts in the United 
Kingdom use the term ‘corporate opportunity’, the corporate-opportunity rule as 
developed in the United States, is not applied.  Matters involving the 
appropriation of corporate opportunities generally continue to be approached on 
the basis of the no-conflict and no-profit rules.  There have, however, been 
exceptions to the strict no-conflict and no-profit approach where courts have 
followed a more pragmatic approach. 
 
The pragmatic approach provides that the nature of the opportunity be 
considered. That involves asking whether the opportunity falls with the 
                                            
219
 Dobbie 2008 Trinity CLR 26. 
220
 Lowry 2012 IRL 11; Bhullar v Bhullar [2002] EWCA Civ 1509 paras [12] to [13]. 
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company’s line of business, or whether it is a maturing business opportunity.221  
If it is established that the opportunity meets these criteria, the enquiry is then 
taken further and the question is asked whether there was a conflict between 
the director’s personal interest and his or her duty to the company. 
 
The UK Companies Act contains a comprehensive codification of directors’ 
duties.  This is in contrast to the 2008 Companies Act which has only partially 
codified these duties.  Furthermore, other than the 2008 Companies Act, 
section 175 of the UK Act refers specifically to a duty to avoid a conflict of 
interests, particularly in regard to the exploitation of an opportunity. 
 
By referring to ‘opportunity’ the UK Companies Act has gone a step further than 
the 2008 Companies Act.  The UK Act makes it clear that a director’s interest 
will be in conflict with those of the company if he or she exploits an opportunity.  
However, while the UK Companies Act does not define ‘opportunity’, the 
principles that have been developed at common law continue to apply.222      
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this dissertation has been, firstly, to consider whether the 
partially codified directors’ duties are wide enough to cover matters involving the 
appropriation of corporate opportunities.  Secondly, the purpose has been to 
consider the appropriate common-law test or tests to be applied in establishing 
whether, in the particular circumstances, an opportunity should be classified as 
a corporate opportunity. 
 
The South African position was compared to that in Australia and England.  The 
purpose of the comparison was to ascertain the post-codification approach to 
matters involving the appropriation of corporate opportunities, and in so doing to 
consider the approach that South African courts are likely to adopt when 
adjudicating matters involving the appropriation of corporate opportunities post-
codification. 
 
5.2 Partial codification: The 2008 Companies Act 
 
The 2008 Companies Act has only partially codified the duties of directors.  
These partially codified duties can be found in section 76 of the 2008 
Companies Act. 
 
Section 76 does not refer to corporate opportunities or to the corporate- 
opportunity rule.  It is submitted that the provisions of section 76 are sufficiently 
wide to cover the corporate-opportunity rule.  In interpreting and applying 
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section 76 of the Companies Act in a corporate opportunity matter, the 
common-law rules and principles will continue to apply. 
 
 
5.3 Nature and scope 
 
It emerged from the discussions in Chapters Three and Four that Australian and 
English courts have continued to apply pre-codification principles to matters 
involving the breach of directors’ fiduciary duties generally, and in matters 
involving the appropriation of corporate opportunities specifically.  This is 
despite these duties having been codified (in the UK) or partially codified (in 
Australia). 
 
In Chapter Two we saw that the court in Da Silva attempted to set out a test that 
could be used to determine whether a particular opportunity was, in the 
circumstances, a corporate opportunity.  While the tests set out in Da Silva may 
not have set out all the requirements as comprehensively as one would have 
wished, they at the very least, provide a framework within which a South African 
corporate-opportunity rule can be further developed. 
 
While decisions of the courts in Australia and the United Kingdom do not 
provide guidance in regard to the application of, in particular, the corporate- 
opportunity rule and the tests, the general approach of the courts to the 
application of fiduciary duties post-codification, do provide guidance on a likely 
approach to matters involving corporate opportunities post-codification. 
 
5.4 Conclusion and recommendation 
 
In the absence of clear provisions in the 2008 Companies Act referring to 
corporate opportunities, the common-law principles and rules will continue to 
apply.  Much as the courts in both Australia and England continue to apply the 
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pre-codification principles when interpreting the statutory duties, so too should 
the test set out in Da Silva provide the basis for interpreting and applying 
section 76(3) to matters involving the appropriation of corporate opportunities.  
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